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On Greatness and Constitutional Vision: 
Justice Byron R. White 
Rex E. ~ e e *  & Richard G. Wilkins** 
When Justice Byron R. White announced his retirement, a 
reporter asked one of the authors of this article whether 
Justice White was one of history's "good" Supreme Court 
Justices or one of the "greats." The answer was, "great." 
The reporter responded that he would expect a former law 
clerk1 to give that answer, but pointed out that most people 
reserve the adjective "great" for those Justices who come to the 
Court with certain favored doctrines, who develop and adhere 
to these doctrines throughout their careers, and who live to see 
them (or a t  least some of them) become settled law partly (and 
in some cases largely) through their efforts. This pattern, the 
reporter said, has not described Justice White. 
In one sense, the reporter had a point. It has been difficult 
to identify Byron White with any particular policy or viewpoint. 
As Professor Leon Friedman noted some fifteen years ago, 
"[blecause he has not aligned himself at either end of the 
spectrum of the Court, it is difficult to define his work or his 
judicial philosophy."2 A more recent (and decidedly less 
sympathetic) observer has asserted that Justice White appears 
"uninterested in articulating a constitutional vi~ion."~ But 
unlike the reporter (and the last quoted commentator), we 
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An earlier (and shorter) version of this Article has appeared in the JOU-1 of 
Supreme Court History. See 1993 J .  SUP. CT. HIST. 5. 
1. Rex E. Lee clerked for Justice White during the October 1963 Term. 
2. Leon Friedman, Bryon R. White, in 5 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT: TKEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 345, 345 (Leon 
Friedman ed., 1978). 
3. Jeffrey Rosen, The Next Justice: How Not to Replace Byron White, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Apr. 12, 1993, at 21, 21. 
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believe that Justice White's approach to constitutional 
adjudication neither disqualifies him for the adjective "great" 
nor establishes a lack of "constitutional  isi ion."^ On the 
contrary, his constant and committed dedication to non- 
ideological case-by-case adjudication, in the grand common law 
tradition of American constitutional law, both secures his claim 
to greatness and evidences his over-arching constitutional 
vision. 
I t  is an article of faith among many that an absolute 
prerequisite to judicial greatness is a firm commitment to a 
"persuasive judicial phil~sophy."~ And not only must truly 
great jurists have a persuasive philosophy (meaning, we 
suppose, a personal commitment to pre-conceived notions of 
liberty, fairness andlor justice), they must be able to "project 
their philosophy from case to case."6 The Justices of the United 
States Supreme Court-so this line of reasoning goes-fill a 
role more exalted than merely interpreting a written 
Constitution: they are judicial policymakers who bring the 
Constitution into "existence" when they make "hard" decisions 
(supposedly) too intense for mere politics.' It would follow that 
their philosophy must be not only "persuasive" but also 
"pervasive." 
According to these theorists, democracy has beconie too 
inefficient to deal with modern problems. Ordinary politics has 
4. Justice White's incremental and measured approach to judicial 
decisionmaking clearly does not warrant dismissing him as a mere "legal 
technician" who has "never transcended his initial incarnation as the jock justice." 
Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. E.g., ARTHUR S. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL CTMSM: THE 
POLITICAL ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 6 (1982) (stating that one of the book's 
purposes is "to both defend modern judicial 'activism,' plus call for even more 
activism") id. a t  233-34 ("The Supreme C o u r t t h e  judges generally-should be 
even more activist than they are a t  present. The time has come not only for 
candid acknowledgment of 'truth in judging'-the view that Supreme Court Justices 
make up the law as they go along, in accordance with their personal 
predilections--but for even more intervention by the judiciary into socioeconomic 
matters."l(footnote omitted); id. at  269-70 ("The Judges can show the way, if only 
they will seize the opportunity, for even more of the corpus of American public 
policy to take. They can make choices, hard for officers in the political branches, 
that cannot be avoided as the Constitution of Control comes into existence."). 
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resulted in a stifling "pluralism'" that prevents progress and 
thwarts development of important rights. Thus, to  remedy the 
perceived "shortcomings of pluralism," some have called upon 
the Justices of the Supreme Court to  hammer out a new 
"Constitution of Contr01."~ The Justices, these commentators 
seem to assert, must assume the status of social diagnosticians, 
ascertaining society's ills and then concocting and measuring 
out the needed constitutional elixir-no matter how unwilling 
to swallow their medicine the general populace may be.'' 
Such views are provocative and-to judge from discussions 
in the popular press regarding the importance of the personal 
views of judicial nominees"-rather widely accepted (even if 
the full ramifications of this acceptance are not fully 
understood). We believe, however, that the proper role of a 
judge is not quite as exalted as the foregoing discussion would 
suggest. The conscious development of policy over time through 
the exercise of one's office is a function that is normally, and 
quite properly, associated with the representative-and 
politically accountable-branches of government. The role of 
the judge, by contrast, should be to decide discrete cases.12 
That role, of course, will often raise policy questions. In 
deciding cases, a judge must "interpret[] the laws passed by the 
legislature and the regulations issued by executive agencies, 
and monitor[] the conduct of government agencies, public 
institutions, and even private individuals and groups in the 
light of the Constit~tion."'~ At times, because of statutory or 
8. Id. at 270-71. 
9. Id. 
10. But see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2884 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[Tlhe 
notion that the Court must adhere to a decision for as long as the decision faces 
'great opposition' and the Court is 'under fire' acquires a character of almost 
czarist arrogance.") 
11. See, e.g., Max Boot, Ginsburg Hearings Provide Some Insight into Judge's 
Ideals, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 26, 1993, at 4; Neil A. Lewis, A New Era in 
Abortion: End of Litmus Test for Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1993, at  
A13 (discussing Justice Ginsburg's view on abortion); see also Linda P. Campbell, 
Many Pathways Lead to the Supreme Court: Mix of Credentials, Connections, Luck, 
CHI. TRIB., May 9, 1993, $ 1, at  21 ("[Plotential nominees have faced intense 
scrutiny of their legal views and personal background."). 
12. A federal appellate judge once noted that "[tlhe function of the judge is of 
a quite different order from the functions of the legislator and administrator. The 
judge has the ancient task of settling disputes between specific individuals, groups, 
or institutions-a field we could call private law." FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF 
A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH 9 (1980). 
13. Id. 
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constitutional ambiguity, this interpretive task will inevitably 
involve resolution of policy disputes. But while judges 
unquestionably grapple with policy, they do it in the context of 
discrete cases. 
It follows, we believe, that the only legitimate way that 
policy should result from judicial minds and pens is through 
the exercise of case-by-case, decisional authority. Policy 
development should not be the primary judicial objective. On 
the contrary, the judge's for&g of policy should be incidental 
to the decision of actual cases, progressing only as necessity 
and experience mandate.14 
Some who adhere to a more sweeping conception of the 
judicial role have lamented Byron R. White's purported lack of 
"vision" on the Court.15 We believe, however, that this 
criticism-with its concomitant emphasis on personal 
philosophy-is seriously flawed. A judge is not (or a t  least 
should not be) a policy czar who marks the boundaries of the 
Constitution by the light of a n  unknown (and perhaps 
unknowable) inner vision. Rather, a judge (and especially a 
Justice of the Supreme Court) decides discrete controversies 
and sets policy only in the context of interpreting written 
law-i.e., statutes and the Constitution. And evaluated by that 
standard, Justice White belongs with the best? 
Undoubtedly, Bryon R. White has been something of a 
judicial enigma. 
14. As Justice Felix Frankfurter has noted, 
[Ilt is not the business of this Court to pronounce policy. I t  must observe 
a fastidious regard for limitations on its own power, and this precludes 
the Court's giving effect to its own notions of what is wise or politic. 
That self-restraint is of the essence in the observance of the judicial oath, 
for the Constitution has not authorized the judges to sit in judgment on 
the wisdom of what Congress and the Executive Branch do. 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 120 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Of course, 
Justice Frankfurter's view of the judicial role is criticized as shortsighted by those 
holding grander judicial pretensions. E.g., MILLER, supra note 7 ,  at  268 
("Frankfurter and [Learned] Hand are the leading saints in the hagiology of what 
may be called the Frankfurter School of Judicial Criticism," which insists that 
judges follow 'Whiggish, Burkean views of proper public policy."). 
15. E.g., Rosen, supra note 3. 
16. See Pierce 07Donnell, Justice Byron R. White: Leading fiom the Center, 
A.B.A. J., June 15, 1986, a t  24, 27 (noting Justice White's "preference for case-by- 
case adjudication" over "assertions of overriding philosophy"). 
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Over the years, &el has defied labeling. Early on, he voted 
with the liberal bloc on civil rights and school desegregation 
but with conservatives on crime. In the landmark criminal 
rulings of the Warren era, White ofken dissented, as he did in 
the Miranda case. Along with Rehnquist, he cast a dissenting 
vote in Roe v. Wade and has made clear he will overturn the 
right to abortion if the opportunity arises. Unlike Rehnquist 
or Brennan, however, he has never set forth a broad view of 
the Constitution or of the Court's role in interpreting it. 
White has a quick, penetrating mind but avoids philosophy or 
broader principles of law. He decides cases and no more.'' 
The inability of journalists and scholars to pin an appropriate 
label on Justice White has generated much of the criticism 
thrown his way.18 Indeed, some of Justice White's harshest 
criticslg cite as Exhibit 1 for their case-in-chief his propensity 
to "decide[] cases and no Others, moving from the 
same starting point, have asserted that his jurisprudence lacks 
"~onsistency."~~ These purported "defects," some have argued, 
evidence an  overall lack of judicial greatne~s.~'  We believe 
these complaints not only reach the wrong conclusion, but 
establish the basis for exactly the opposite conclusion. 
To begin, there is a decent argument that-if one takes 
into account not only the quality but also the breadth of his 
accomplishments-the most accomplished person to come out of 
the American twentieth century is Byron R. White. In  sports, 
he was an All-American and professional football player:3 
17. DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST 
SUPREME COURT 92-93 (1992); see also Reynolds Holding, Byron White-High 
Court's Legal Purist: A Kennedy Appointee but Known as a Conservative, S.F. 
CHRON., Mar. 20, 1993, at A1 ("[Hle has proved as adept at  avoiding ideological 
tags as he was at  eluding tacklers . . . ."). 
18. See, e.g., Holding, supra note 17, at  A1 (characterizing Justice White's 
record as "maddeningly inconsistent to those looking for clear stands on the major 
issues of the day"); Rosen, supra note 3; see also Charles Fried, A Tribute to 
Jwtice Byron R. White, 107 HARv. L. REV. 20, 20 (1993) (characterizing Justice 
White's votes in two cases as "clearly, even provocatively, inconsistent"); Richard 
Carelli, Court Swings from Conservative Path: Ruling on Inmates' Rights Is a 
Further Sign of Split, STAR TRIB., Apr. 23, 1993, at 7A (characterizing Justice 
White's vote in one case as "somewhat inconsistent"). 
19. Rosen, supra note 3. 
20. SAVAGE, supra note 17, at 93. 
2 1. See supra note 18. 
22. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text. 
23. Byron White earned nine varsity letters at  the University of Colorado, 
played professional football for the Pittsburgh Steelers and the Detroit Lions, and 
was later enshrined in the Pro Football Hall of Fame. WILLLAM H. REHNQUIST, HE 
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known to many as "Whizzer White."24 In law school, he was 
a n  editor of the Yale Law Journal. In practice, he was a 
partner in one of Denver's most prestigious firms. In the 
executive branch of the federal government, he occupied one of 
the most significant positions: Deputy Attorney General. And 
in  the judicial branch, he held one of the most important posts 
for thirty-one years, the ninth longest tenure in the history of 
the C o ~ r t . ' ~  
In short, even though the twentieth century may have 
produced better athletes, a few (but only a few) lawyers and top 
Justice Department officials who were in his class, and several 
Supreme Court Justices who were as good (though, for reasons 
discussed below, very few), perhaps no one in this century has 
excelled across such a broad range of accomplishments as has 
Byron R. White.26 This remarkable record must be given 
significant weight in any calculation of Justice White's stature. 
Indeed, if far-flung knowledge is (as some have argued) an 
essential element of judicial greatness:' Byron White is 
SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 257 (1987). 
24. Justice White, to our knowledge, has not wanted people to call him 
"Whizzer," perhaps because he does not want to be remembered principally as a 
football player. The one possible exception seems to consist of athletes with whom 
or against whom he has competed. Once when he visited the Brigham Young 
University Law School in the late 1970s, Justice White was joined for d i ~ e r  by 
"Hack" Miller, a news reporter for the Deseret News, who in his college playing 
days a t  the University of Utah had competed against the Justice in basketball. As 
the evening progressed, Justice White seemed not to mind-and to even 
enjoy-being addressed as "Whizzer" by ''Hack.'' 
25. Other Justices who have served longer are William 0. Douglas (36 years), 
Hugo L. Black (34 years), John Marshall (34 years), William J. B r e ~ a n  (33 years), 
Stephen J. Field (34 years), John Marshall Harlan I (33 years), Joseph Story (33 
years), and James M. Wayne (32 years). THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 965-71 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992); Albert P. 
Blaustein & Roy M. Mersky, The Statistics on the Supreme Court, in 4 THE 
JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR 
OPINIONS 3187, 3189 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969). 
26. See SIDNEY H. ASCH, THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS GREAT JUSTICES 221- 
22 (1971) (stating that "Byron R. White exemplifies the Greek ideal of a sound 
mind in a sound body. . . . A clear example of the cool and dispassionate New 
Frontiersman' . . . . White's personality exudes competence and the ability to make 
close and practical judgments."). Some of his characteristics as an athlete also 
characterized his later life as a member of the Supreme Court. It has been said 
that he was a football player who was fast enough to run around the defenders, 
but really preferred to run through them. SAVAGE, supra note 17, a t  89. 
27. One study has listed "wide general knowledge and learning" as one of the 
characteristics of a successful Supreme Court Justice, ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & ROY 
M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES: STATISTICAL STUDIES ON THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 50-51 (1978), while Judge Learned Hand 
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plainly one of the greats. He is a man who is interested in 
almost everything, whether legal issues or others, and his mind 
is capable of reaching almost as much as his interest. Over the 
decades, law clerks consistently observed that he always 
managed to stay several steps ahead of their efforts. His 
reputation among Supreme Court practitioners as a relentless 
and difficult questioner is well deserved, mainly because he 
was consistently so well prepared and had thought through the 
difficult issues with such thoroughness and care that he was 
always able, and usually willing, to challenge even the most 
sophisticated argument made by counsel.z8 
With such a background, the complaint that Justice White 
has failed to  articulate an overarching "judicial philos~phy"~~ 
and has, instead, "decide[d] cases and no more"30 is hardly 
damning. Rather, his non-ideological approach to deciding cases 
has been the fountain of his strength. 
One of Byron White's greatest strengths has been his acute 
awareness of the respective competencies of the legislative and 
judicial branche~.~' Indeed, at his confirmation hearing, he 
testified that the 'legislative power is not vested in the 
Supreme Court," and he asserted that the "major instrument 
for changing the laws in this country is the Congress of the 
United  state^."^' This fundamental commitment to a limited 
judicial role is the foundation for the Justice's "preference for 
case-by-case adjudication," as well as for his "'aversion to large 
statements, to assertions of oveniding philo~ophy."'~~ 
asserted that a judge passing on a constitutional question must "have a t  least a 
bowing acquaintance with Acton and Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbon and 
Carlyle, with Homer, Dante, Shakespeare and Milton, with Machiavelli, Montaigne 
and Rabelais, with Plato, Bacon, Hume and Kant," LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF 
LIBERTY 8 1  (1952). 
28. See REHNQUIST, supra note 23, at  257 ("His gruff voice and penetrating 
questions still strike terror into the hearts of unprepared attorneys arguing orally 
before the Court the way he used to terrifj. his football opponents."); Friedman, 
supra note 2, a t  356 ("[Justice White] is generally the most penetrating questioner 
of lawyers who argue before the Court."). 
29. Rosen, supra note 3, a t  25. 
30. SAVAGE, supra note 17, at  93. 
31. See, e.g., Byron R. White, Some Current Debates, 73 JUDICATURE 155, 158, 
161 (1989) (noting the interpretive problems faced by the Court in construing 
detailed legislative schemes, and outlining steps Congress might take to  insure 
judicial implementation of legislative policy). 
32. Nomination of Bryon R. White: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1962) (statement of Byron R. White). 
33. O 'Do~el l ,  supra note 16, a t  27 (quoting Lance Liebman). Both Liebman 
and O 'Do~e l l  are former Byron White law clerks. 
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To be sure, by the time of his retirement, after more than 
three decades of deciding cases, we know his views on 
abortion,34 the three-part    ern on^^ tes t  for deciding 
establishment of religion Miranda u. Arizona3' and 
its cor rec tnes~ ,~~ and other important constitutional and law 
enforcement issues. But this has come about not because he 
characterized himself as a "liberal" or "conservative," and then 
did his judging consistent with what a good liberal or good 
conservative would be expected to do, or because in any other 
respect he started from some pre-determined policy position. 
Rather, Justice White's views have evolved over time as he has 
exercised the only authority that the Constitution vests in 
Article I11 judges: to decide cases and controversies. 
Because of his case-by-case orientation, Justice White has 
been hesitant to impress his personal views upon the body of 
American constitutional law. A sterling example of this trait is 
the opinion he wrote for the Court in Lamb's Chapel u. Center 
Moriches Union Free School DistrictSg during his h a 1  Term. 
In that opinion, Justice White explicitly declined to reverse 
Lemon:' a much-maligned (especially by him) Establishment 
Clause precedent:' despite the apparent presence of five votes 
to inter the case.42 Why did Justice White fail to write an 
34. See, e.g., P l a ~ e d  Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2855, 2873 
(concurring and dissenting opinions joined by White, J.); Thornburgh v. American 
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 785 (White, J., dissenting); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 221 (1973) (White, J. dissenting). 
35. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
36. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) 
(White, J., concurring in judgment); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2685 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., joined by White, J., dissenting). 
37. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
38. Id., 384 U.S. a t  526 (White, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 
96, 107 (1975) (White, J., concurring in the result); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 
222 (1971). 
39. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993). 
40. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
41. E.g., ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1982); Jesse 
H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-An Update, 75 
CAL. L. REV. 5 (1987); Philip B. Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the Burger 
Court, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1984); William P. Marshall, W e  &ow It When We 
See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment; 59 S. CAL. L. REV, 495 (1986); 
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
42. See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2149-51 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting 
Justice White's past disagreement with Lemon and chastising the Court for its 
failure to reverse a supposedly discredited precedent). 
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opinion in Lamb's Chapel reversing Lemon when his own 
disapproval was clear? 
While no definitive answer (short of candid disclosure by 
Justice White himself) can be given, there is one likely 
possibility. At the time he wrote the opinion in Lamb's Chapel, 
Justice White knew he would be leaving the Court. He was also 
aware that, while he and four other members of the then- 
current Court disapproved of Lemon, the case had not lost the 
support of perhaps as many a s  four other sitting Justices.43 
Justice White, moreover, did not know whether his 
replacement on the Court would support (or disapprove of) 
Lemon. Accordingly, if he wrote an opinion reversing Lemon in  
Lamb's Chapel, he might be discarding a precedent that-in 
the near future-could again have the support of a majority of 
the Court. 
In such circumstances, i t  is quite possible that Justice 
White simply determined that he would leave the fate of Lemon 
to his successor. He would not, in short, force his personal 
views upon the United States Constitution as a matter of 
individual will. If this plausible explanation for Justice White's 
refusal to make "Lemonade" in Lamb's Chapel is accurate, it is 
yet another indication of the  Justice's careful-and 
laudable-decisionmaking style. 
This measured approach to the judicial role has not 
resulted-as some have charged-in a jurisprudence that lacks 
"con~istency."~~ It has become almost commonplace for certain 
commentators to claim that Justice White, a supposed "liberal" 
a t  the time of his appointment, has often joined "conservative" 
opinions.45 Building upon this observation, others have argued 
43. See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2150 (Scalia, J., concurring) (counting 
the votes agains tand,  inferentially for-lemon). 
44. E.g., Rosen, supra note 3, a t  25 (asserting that Justice White somehow 
"relish[es] his inconsistencies"). 
45. E.g., Fred L. Israel, Bryon R. White, in 4 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS, supra note 25, a t  
2951, 2960-61 ("With White, a New Frontier Democrat, replacing Whittaker, a 
conservative Republican, it was expected that the Court balance would decisively 
tilt toward the liberal bloc--but, alas, this was a misplaced expectation . . . .") 
(emphasis added); Holding, supm note 17, a t  A8 ("Perhaps no one would have been 
more surprised by White's record than the man who appointed him . . . ."); David 
0. Stewart, White to the R~ght, A.B.A. J., July 1990, at 40 (asserting that Justice 
White is "[olrdinarily conservative"). The utility of such observations is 
questionable. See COFFIN, supra note 12, at  201 ("All that I think can be justly 
said about the utility of applying overworked labels to judges is that they are 
appropriate to some judges on some issues some of the time. But to use them as 
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that  the Justice has reached "inconsistent" results in individual 
cases.46 In our view, Byron White has been mercurial neither 
in  his philosophy nor in his results. 
As an initial matter, it is far from clear that Byron White 
has, in fact, deviated much from the supposed liberalism of the 
man who appointed him: John F. Kennedy. One can question, 
for example, whether JFK himself was really as liberal as most 
people assu~ne.~' Indeed, Justice White's jurisprudence has 
been described as a snapshot of the Kennedy era: "pro-labor, 
pro-civil rights (but not affirmative action), strong on national 
security and very anti-crime."48 If this description is accurate 
(as we believe it is), Byron White's supposed conservatism may 
result more fkom shifts in the liberal agenda than from any 
discernable movement on the part of the Justice himself.49 
The conjectured conservatism of Justice White, in any 
event, is hardly apparent from a candid review of his voting 
record. His votes implicating racial or sexual  preference^,^' 
school desegregation5' and other discrimination cases52 (as 
will be discussed below)53 are  neither "liberal" nor 
"conservative." To be sure, his performance in such public 
attention-catching areas as abortion,54 law enf~rcernent,'~ 
generic descriptions characterizing judges on supposedly major points of difference 
exaggerates the extent to which they may fairly apply."). 
46. See generally Rosen, supra note 3, at 25. 
47. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Justice Byron White: The Consistent Curmudgeon, 
LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 22, 1993, at 30, 30 (asserting that JFK was not "the kind of 
liberal" that many assume). 
48. Stewart, supra note 45, at 42. 
49. E.g., id. at  42 (noting that Justice White's Ke~edy-e ra  agenda "is not a 
pace-setting agenda because it is an agenda from the past"). 
50. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Grove City 
College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); 
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
51. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991). But see Missouri v. 
Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); 
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
52. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 US. 142 (1980); Washington v. 
Davis, 426 US. 229 (1976); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
53. Infra notes 65-82 and accompanying text. 
54. See supra note 34. 
55. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967) (White, J., concurring in 
holding that when a reasonably prudent police officer is warranted in believing 
that his safety or that of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable search 
for weapons of the person believed by him to be armed and dangerous regardless 
of whether he has probable cause to arrest); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 526 
(1966) (White, J., dissenting); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1964) (White, 
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~ o d o r n y ~ ~  church-state relationships,s7 and pornography5' 
could be called "conservative" by a traditional pigeonholer. On 
the other hand, however, if that same pigeonholer looks to 
cases involving the powers of state and local governments vis-h- 
vis the federal governmentF9 federal regulatory authority in 
general (including an t i t r~s t ) ,~ '  labor and securities issues,6l 
J., dissenting from holding that right to counsel attaches when police investigation 
focuses on a particular suspect in police custody and that statements made after 
suspect has been denied access to counsel are inadmissible against suspect); Malloy 
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 33 (1964) (White, J., dissenting from holding that witness's 
claim of privilege against self-incrimination in statutory inquiry should have been 
upheld); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 685 (1962) (White, J., dissenting 
from holding that California statute criminalizing addiction to narcotics inflicts 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); 
see also United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. 257 (1990); Clemons v. Mississippi, 
494 U.S. 738 (1990); Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); United States v. 
Watson, 423 US.  411 (1976); United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974); United 
States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 
U.S. 266 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); United States v. 
White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Parker v. 
North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Chime1 v. California, 395 U.S. 752 
(1969); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). But see James v. Illinois, 493 
U.S. 307 (1990). 
56. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
57. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 
2217 (1993); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 
2141 (1993); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Committee for Pub. Educ. & 
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 US. 646 (1980); Board of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. 
No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
58. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); FW/PBS v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 
(1990); Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15 (1973); John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Massachusetts, 
383 U.S. 413, 460 (1966) (White, J., dissenting from holding that material must be 
utterly without redeeming social value in order to be banned as obscenity). 
59. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989); ASARCO Inc. v. 
Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989). 
60. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that furing maximum 
as well as minimum resale prices by agreement or combination is a per se 
violation of 8 1 of the Sherman Act); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 
(1967) (holding that any merger must be tested by standard of 8 7 of the Clayton 
Act, that is, whether it may substantially lessen competition, which requires a 
prediction of the merger's impact on present and future competition); United States 
v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (White, J., concurring in holding that 
merger tended to decrease competition in violation of 8 7 of the Clayton Act); 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (holding that proposed 
merger might lessen competition in violation of 8 7 of the Clayton Act); see also 
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990); Continental T.V., 
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 
U.S. 720 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
61. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (1990); Carpenter v. 
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or the powers of Congress vis-his  those of the Pre~ident ,~~  
then he belongs in the "liberal" box. Byron R. White, in sum, 
has been neither liberal nor conservative. He has been the 
proverbial "man in the 
Some might (and, indeed, have) looked at this record and 
asserted that Justice White has lacked "consistency" in 
deciding cases.64 On that issue, we ask, consistency with 
what? Precisely because the job of the Article I11 judge is to 
decide cases and controversies, it would be a mistake for a 
federal judge to fit himself or herself into a liberal or 
conservative slot and then decide cases on that basis. The 
consistency that really counts is consistency with Article I11 
obligations, and not consistent performance as an ideologue. 
And on this score, no one has evidenced more consistent 
devotion to the careful, non-ideological decision of individual 
cases than has Byron White. 
A sampling of Justice White's views regarding 
constitutional and legislative prohibitions on racial 
discrimination is illustrative. Early in his career, he joined 
opinions which read the Fourteenth Amendment broadly to  
prohibit state practices (such as poll taxes) that limited access 
to the voting booth.65 He also joined opinions which greatly 
expanded congressional authority to  regulate private, invidious 
dis~rimination~~ and recognized Congress' plenary power to 
United States, 484 US. 19 (1987); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). 
But see Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Kern County Land 
Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973). 
62. Bowsher v. S p a r ,  478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
63. For the past several years, one of the authors has conducted a statistical 
study of the voting patterns of Supreme Court Justices. See, e.g., Richard G. 
Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1992 Term, 8 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 229 
(1993) [hereinafter Wilkins et al., 1992 Term]; Richard G. Wilkins et  al., Supreme 
Court Voting Behavior: 1991 Term, 7 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1 (1992). This statistical 
study shows that Justice White ended his judicial career as he conducted it: 
without closely aligning himself with either ideological wing of the Court. Wilkins 
et  al., 1992 Term, supra, a t  236 (noting that Justice White ends his career 
between the Court's ideological poles, precisely where he was positioned during 
most of the years covered by the study); see also James J. Kilpatrick, Justice 
Byron White, Hard to Classify, Will Be Missed on the Supreme Court, ATLANTA J. 
& CONST., Mar. 31, 1993, a t  A19 (Justice White "brought no ideological baggage"; a 
"simplistic view regards White as a 'conservative'" while "[aln equally superficial 
[view] could establish White's credentials as a liberal."). 
64. Rosen, supra note 3, at  25; see also sources cited supra note 18. 
65. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
66. E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
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enforce the Equal Protection Clause.67 Nevertheless, Justice 
White also wrote the Court's opinion in Washington v. Davis,G8 
which limited the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
"purposeful" discrimination, and joined the opinion in City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson CO.,~' which subjected a municipal 
ordinance affording class-based relief to  minority businesses to 
"strict scrutiny." 
Are these positions consistent? Why would a Justice who 
voted to strike down a poll tax thereafter conclude that the 
Equal Protection Clause reaches only "purposeful" 
discrimination? Why would a Justice who would accord 
Congress substantial latitude in remedying racial 
discrimination nevertheless subject state-created class-based 
remedies to strict scrutiny? Are these results, as some have 
charged, merely the result of an ad hoc approach to the 
decision of constitutional questions that is pragmatic but 
ultimately unsound? We believe that there are plausible 
answers to these (and similar) queries, and that the decisions 
noted above are not only consistent, but display a clear judicial 
(and constitutional) vision. 
Justice White's voting record--from invalidating the poll 
tax7' to  Washington v. Davis-is consistent with the central 
command of the Equal Protection Clause: no "person" shall be 
denied "the equal protection of the  law^."^' Indeed, if proof of 
a disproportionate impacti.e., the fact that a regulatory 
scheme bears more heavily upon blacks than whites, or upon 
males than females-were sufficient to establish a 
constitutional violation, the focus of the Equal Protection 
Clause would undergo a dramatic shift. "The central purpose of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of 
race," wrote Justice ~ h i t e . ' ~  But if disproportionate impact 
alone established a constitutional violation, government could 
never act without acting on the basis of race. Virtually every 
governmental decision-from taxation, to  zoning, to usury 
rates-would become enmeshed in racial politics, resulting in a 
67. E.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
68. 426 US. 229 (1976). 
69. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
70. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, $ 1. 
72. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239. 
304 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
shift in focus from constitutional protection of the "person" to 
protection of the person's "class."73 In short, the jurisprudence 
of the man whose work we examine here demonstrates 
profound respect for (and consistency in adjudicating) the equal 
protection claims of i n d i ~ i d u a l s . ~ ~  
There is, furthermore, no inconsistency between the Justice 
White who would accord Congress substantial latitude to 
enforce the Fourteenth A m e n d ~ n e n t ~ ~  and the Justice White 
who would subject state-created racial classifications to strict 
scrutiny.76 Nothing in Croson cuts back on congressional 
authority to implement class-based remedies. Indeed, one year 
after joining Croson, Justice White joined the majority opinion 
in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. u. FCC,?? in which the Court held 
that class-based remedies enacted by Congress need not pass 
strict scrutiny but, instead, will be tested under a substantially 
more deferential standard of reviewe7' Justice White's 
appa ren t  conclusion, i.e., t h a t  s ta te-created racial  
73. See, e.g., id. a t  248. 
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless 
invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens 
one race more than another would be far reaching and would raise 
serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, 
welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be 
more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more 
affluent white. 
Id. 
74. E.g., SAVAGE, supra note 17, at  218. 
Almost alone among the justices, [Byron White] could claim a record of 
consistency on the issue of racial discrimination. When confronted in the 
1960s and 1970s with cases where blacks had suffered racial 
discrimination, White sided with them. This put him in the liberal camp, 
a t  least on civil rights. However, in the 1980s, when whites came to the 
Court with evidence that they had suffered racial discrimination, he sided 
with them, too. 
Id.; see also Burton Atkins & William Taggart, Substantive Access Doctrines and 
Conflict Management in the U.S. Supreme Court: Reflections on Activism and 
Restraint, in SUPREME COURT ACTMSM AND RESTRAINT 351, 375-76 (Stephen C. 
Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982) (finding Justice White one of only three 
Justices whose voting on issues concerning access to court was "highly consistent 
over the Warren and Burger Court years"). 
75. E.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
76. City of Richmond v. JA.  Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
77. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
78. Under Croson, municipal class-based remedies must be necessary to 
further a compelling governmental interest. 488 U.S. at 498-506. Under Metro, 
however, congressionally enacted class-based remedies will pass constitutional 
muster so long as they are substantially related to the achievement of an 
important governmental purpose. 497 U.S. a t  565-66. 
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~lass~cat ions  are highly suspicious and therefore require 
rigorous justifi~ation'~ while similar federal actions do not, is 
hardly "inconsistent" or "unprincipled." On the contrary, it 
represents the modern embodiment of federal theory reaching 
back at least as far as The Federalist Papers: political action at 
the national level is less subject to abuse than similar action at 
the local level." 
Justice White, finally, has refrained from inflexible, 
doctrinaire stands on the issues raised by the foregoing cases. 
While he insists upon proof of "purposeful" discrimination, he 
will accept-as indicative of "purpose"--evidence that some 
members of the Court have suggested amounts to little more 
than a disguised "disproportionate impact" analy~is.~' Justice 
White's record, in short, confirms the observation of one of his 
former clerks that he is "'a lawyer's lawyer, and . . . sees the 
cases as law cases, not as matters of social poli~y.""~ 
The results capsulized above are not the result of accident, 
nor do they evidence a lack of vision or consistency.83 On the 
contrary, they confirm that Byron White is perhaps the most 
consistent member of the Supreme Court in the only respect in 
which consistency really matters: fidelity to  the constitutional 
duty t o  decide individual cases in accordance with the facts and 
applicable law. Presented with discrete controversies, Justice 
White has concluded that there are limits beyond which the 
Fourteenth Amendment may come to protect a "class" rather 
than a "person," and that there is a difference between 
79. See, e.g., Croson, 488 US. at 495-96 (noting that the class-based 
preference invalidated in Croson was adopted by a city council composed 
predominantly of minorities). 
80. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, a t  324 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that the size of the federal government "will render an 
unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not 
impracticable"); THE FEDERALIST No. 10, a t  82-84 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct 
parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the 
more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the 
number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within 
which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of 
oppression."). 
81. E.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 US. 613 (1982) (concluding that the so-called 
"Zimmer factors," developed in a line of disparate impact cases, nevertheless 
established purposehl discrimination); see Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 
(5th Cir. 1973). 
82. Stewart, supra note 45, at  42. 
83. See Rosen, supra note 3, at  21. 
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congressional action dealing with race and similar action at the 
local level. While scholars and others may quibble with how the 
man from Colorado has drawn these particular lines, no one 
can doubt that he has a clear vision of what he has done: 
decided discrete cases on the particular facts and law 
presented. 
We have attempted to  establish two points. First, there is a 
disparity of views regarding the role of a Supreme Court 
Justice: while some would have the Justices establish broad 
social policy in the context of construing the Con~titution,8~ 
others (including ourselves) would limit the Justices rather 
closely t o  the decision of discrete cases, indulging in judicial 
policymaking only to the extent absolutely necessary (and even 
then only in the light of established statutory and 
constitutional policies). Our view is bottomed on the 
Constitution itself. Article I11 authorizes the members of the 
" leas t  dangerousms5 branch to  decide "cases or 
contro~ersies."~ Strangely enough, Article I vests "all 
legislative Powersms7 somewhere else. Second, Justice White 
has quite clearly eschewed the role of social policymaker: he 
has declined the crown of philosopher king and, instead, has 
rather doggedly decided individual cases on their distinct 
records. 
These two points raise the ultimate question: Is he great? 
The answer to this query, of course, depends to some 
extent upon the ideology of the respondent. For those who have 
adopted the model of the Supreme Court Justice as a social 
engineer, a truly great Justice must be a true visionary. 
Because (under this view) the Justices "make up the law as 
they go along, in accordance with their personal 
 predilection^,"^^ the individual jurist must have fairly lofty 
predilections or all (including the Constitution) is lost. 
"Persuasive judicial philosophy"sg and "vi~ion'"~ are all 
84. Supra notes 5-10. 
85. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
86. U.S. CONST. art. 111, $2. 
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, $1. 
88. MILLER, supra note 7, at 233-34. 
89. Rosen, supra note 3, at 25. 
90. Id. at 21. 
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important; without such virtues, not only would a Justice of the 
Supreme Court lack greatness, the Nation would run the risk 
of losing justice (with a small "j") itself. Accordingly, those who 
adhere to this conception of justice and Justices may well be 
somewhat dismissive of Byron R. White; after all, he "decides 
cases and no more."g1 
We take a contrary view because we believe that  a great 
Supreme Court Justice should-first and foremost-decide 
cases. Indeed, transforming the Justices of the Supreme Court 
into visionary constitutional diagnosticians and social engineers 
poses a t  least three significant risks for a democratic society. 
The first risk is that the fact-finding capabilities of judges 
may be limited; they must "make policy" (to the extent they 
"make policy") in the context of facts presented, organized (and 
sometimes created) by legal counsel in a discrete case. 
Legislators, by contrast, are limited neither by Article III's 
case-or-controversy req~irement, '~ nor by the decision of legal 
counsel to construct the record in a particular way.93 The 
legislator not only is free to inquire into any relevant facts, but 
also can  carry t h a t  inqui ry  wherever  t h e  publ ic  
i n t e r e s t r a the r  than the interests of private litigants-might 
indicate. 
The second risk raised by broad judicial policymaking is 
lack of accountability. A major difference between the judiciary 
and the legislature is that legislators must periodically account 
to the people for the way they have carried out their public 
91. SAVAGE, supra note 17, at 93. 
92. Indeed, the judicial authority granted in Article I11 is limited, by its own 
terms, to deciding cases and controversies. US. CONST. art. 111, $ 2. 
93. Litigation records, particularly in public interest lawsuits, are often 
engineered by counsel. For example, in recent litigation involving a Utah abortion 
statute, counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union-hoping to bring an "as 
applied" challenge to an 18-year-old spousal-notification statute-advertised for 
potential plaintiffs in four states. Despite intensive effort, the attorneys were 
unable to uncover a single individual who could complain about the past 
administration of the statute. Without a concrete complainant, legal counsel were 
forced to bring a facial challenge to the statute, arguing what "might" occur under 
the statute rather than what "had" occurred during the past 18 years. See Brief 
for the Defendants-Appellees at 5, Jane L. v. Bangerter, No. 93-4145 (10th Cir. 
filed Aug. 2, 1993). As a result, the constitutionality of the spousal-notification 
provision was determined-not on the basis of actual experiencebut on the basis 
of expert opinion regarding what "could" happen, even though there was no 
evidence that i t  "had" happened. Such a "record" may be firm ground for 
legislative policymaking; it is a rather unstable foundation for judicial 
pronouncement. 
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responsibilities. The absence of judicial accountability makes 
judicial policymaking a decidedly problematic endeavor. 
By definition, "policy" involves issues that affect people, 
and peoples' views regarding those effects may differ mightily. 
The resulting disparity of views may render the legislative 
process difficult-sometimes, exceedingly difficult. In fact, 
commentators who argue for an expansive judicial role assert 
that  such a role is necessary precisely because political choices 
are "hard."g4 But just because a decision is "hard" does not 
mean it should be made by a judge. On the contrary, vesting 
policymaking authority in the judiciary-rather than the 
legislature-renders a representative government less 
accountable for the exercise of that a ~ t h o r i t y . ~ ~  As a result, 
expanding the role of the judiciary to compensate for the 
perceived shortcomings of "p lura l i~m"~~ and the political 
process may only further stultify the ability of our 
representative democracy to deal with crisis.g7 
The third risk an expansive judicial role poses for 
government by "the People"" flows from the preceding point: 
94. MILLER, supra note 7, at  269-70 (Judges "can make choices, hard for 
officers in the political branches, that cannot be avoided."). 
95. See, e.g., JAMES E. BOND, THE ART OF JUDGING 53 (1987) ("[Jludges who 
decide cases as statesmen usurp lawmaking authority from the people and thus 
undermine the rule of law. . . . [A] Court of statesmen encourages an often all-too- 
willing Congress to abdicate its responsibility to decide what the law ought to be 
and whether that law is constitutional."); see also United States v. Richardson, 418 
U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) ("We should be ever mindful of the 
contradictions that would arise if a democracy were to permit general oversight of 
the elected branches of government by a nonrepresentative, and in large measure 
insulated, judicial branch."). 
96. MILLER, supra note 7, at 270-71. 
97. E.g., Richardson, 418 U.S. at  188 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[Rlepeated and 
essentially head-on confrontations between the life-tenured branch and the 
representative branches of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial to 
either. The public confidence essential to the former and the vitality critical to the 
latter may well erode if we do not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our 
power to negative the actions of the other branches."). 
As James Bradley Thayer described in his biography of John Marshall: 
[Tlhe exercise of [the judiciary's power of review], even when unavoidable, 
is always attended with a serious evil, namely, that the correction of 
legislative mistakes comes from the outside, and the people thus lose the 
political experience, and the moral education and stimulus that come from 
fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and correcting their own 
errors. . . . The tendency of a common and easy resort to this great 
function, now lamentably too common, is to dwarf the political capacity of 
the people, and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility. 
JAMES B. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07 (1901). 
98. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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judicial policymaking may prematurely (and unwisely) cut off 
policy debate. To the extent that an issue becomes 
constitutionalized, it is taken from the realm of public 
discourse. This may inhibit both the quality of the ultimate 
policy decision as well as necessary public support for that 
decision. 
The quality of the ultimate lawmaking product is enhanced 
by leaving the relevant issues exposed to the legislative process 
and the public pressures that are brought to bear on that 
process.99 One of the fundamental postulates undergirding a 
free and open democratic society is that the search for truth is 
enhanced by permitting a full and uninhibited discussion of 
public questions.100 Necessarily, such a discussion is more 
effective if the ultimate resolution has not been removed from 
the realm of public debate and solution through constitutional 
adjudication. The best way to  determine who is right and who 
is wrong on difficult social issues is to permit and encourage 
the opposing sides to exercise their persuasive efforts on state 
and national  legislature^.'^^ Equally beneficial to the search 
for the optimal solution is the likelihood that, on any given 
99. E.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 373 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring). The 
Founding Fathers emphatically rejected the suggestion that the federal judiciary 
serve as a "council of revision" to pass upon the wisdom of "every act of the 
National Legislature before it shall operate." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at  21 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter 
RECORDS]. But cf. MILLER, supra note 7, at  296-97 (arguing that the Supreme 
Court should function as a "council of revision" where "[nlot only presidential but 
Congressional actions would be submitted to i t  before promulgation"). Nathaniel 
Gorham of Massachusetts argued that he "did not see the advantage of employing 
the Judges in this way. As Judges they are not to be presumed to possess any 
peculiar knowledge of the mere policy of public measures." 2 RECORDS, supra, a t  
73. I t  was also argued to be "necessary that the Supreme Judiciary should have 
the confidence of the people" and this confidence would "soon be lost, if budges] 
are employed in the task of remonstrating agst. popular measures of the 
Legislature." 2 id. at  76-77 (statement of Luther Martin). Elbridge Gerry of 
Massachusetts asserted that "[hle relied for his part on the Representatives of the 
people as the guardians of their Rights & interests." 2 id. at  75. This sentiment 
was echoed almost a century and three-quarters later by Judge Learned Hand: 
"For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, 
even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not." LEARNED HAND, 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1962). 
100. Abrams v. United States, 250 US. 616, 630 (1919j (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
101. E.g., San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 43 (1973) (In areas 
where opinions are divided, "the judiciary is well advised to refrain from imposing 
on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap 
the continued research and experimentation so vital to finding even partial 
solutions to [social] problems and to keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions."). 
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issue, different legislatures will reach different results and the 
ensuing practical experience will cast further light on the 
underlying issues.lo2 This is the process by which a free, 
elected government works best. 
Pretermitting democratic debate by constitutional 
adjudication, finally, may erode the public support that is vital 
to a secure democratic society. The Supreme Court purported to 
"end" the divisive social debate regarding abortion by deciding 
Roe u. Wade.lo3 But rather than "ending" the debate, Roe has 
engendered social unrest like that last seen during the 1960s' 
civil-rights and anti-war movements. That unrest, moreover, 
continues unabatedlo4-despite ongoing calls from the Court 
for the disputants to  lay down their arms before a supposed 
constitutional concordat.lo5 Ironically, most other democratic 
102. See and compare Justice Brandeis's classic statement on the value of 
social experimentation in his dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 
262, 311 (1932): 
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave 
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with 
serious consequences to the Nation. I t  is one of the happy incidents of 
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the 
power to prevent an experiment. We may strike down the statute which 
embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, 
capricious or unreasonable. We have the power to do this, because the 
due process clause has been held by the Court applicable to matters of 
substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. But in the exercise of 
this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our 
prejudices into legal principles. 
103. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
104. See, e.g., Sandra G. Boodman, Abortion Foes Strike a t  Doctors' Home 
Lives: Illegal Intimidation or Protected Protest?, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1993, at A1 
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had been the targets of violence in 1993); Mary Jordan & Don Phillips, Abortion 
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1993, at A1 (discussing shooting of abortion provider by anti-abortion activist); 
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nations-through the give-and-take of political (rather than 
judicial) debate-have adopted compromise positions that, 
while completely cheering neither "pro-choice" nor "pro-life" 
interests, have muted and largely ended the controversy that 
still rages in American streets.lo6 As the abortion debate 
illustrates, broad judicial intervention in  the policy arena may 
well thwart the development of the consensus necessary to 
communal stability.lO' 
The above concerns convince us that Justice White-by 
"decid[ing] cases and no m~re"'~~-got it right. Rather than a 
social diagnostician, he was an arbiter of public and private 
disputes who filled in policy gaps only as absolutely necessary. 
This gap-filling role, moreover, was undertaken not to satisfy 
overarching idiosyncratic goals, but to give incremental content 
to established constitutional and statutory policies. And while 
these achievements may be described as modest by some, they 
are hardly that. Dispassionate, impartial judging is absolutely 
essential to the proper functioning of our constitutional 
government. And few individuals have performed that role 
better than Byron R. White. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
At the inauguration of the tenth President of Brigham 
Young University, Justice White made the following remarks: 
"[Olur leaders in the government and the private sectors . . . 
must not let the country be paralyzed by the clash of special 
interest groups that may seem unwilling to recognize what 
must necessarily be done, or indeed what must be tried, once 
such a course becomes reasonably clear."log We believe that 
O'Connor, Souter and Kennedy, JJ.) (asserting that the Court's resolution of an 
"intensely divisive controversy" has a "dimension" not carried by the "normal case"; 
i.e. "the dimension present whenever the Court's interpretation of the Constitution 
calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division 
by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution"); see also id. at  2882, 
2885 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing view that the Court's resolution of divisive 
policy issues must end social debate per proprio vigore). 
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the above observation is the ultimate answer to critics who 
charge that Byron White lacks greatness or constitutional 
vision. \He has not been paralyzed by the "clash of special 
interest groups"; instead, he has had the courage-in the 
course of deciding individual cases-to do "what must 
necessarily be done, or indeed what must be tried," once that 
course became "reasonably clear." 
As Leon Friedman once wrote, Justice White "approaches 
each case without preconceived ideas and with a desire to 
examine the individual problem in that case rather than 
deducting the result from set principles. His approach makes 
his work more difficult to analyze but it  makes for greater 
justice in the cases coming before our highest C~urt .""~ No 
grander claim to greatness or to constitutional vision could be 
made by any person who has served on the United States 
Supreme Court. 
110. Friedman, supra note 2, at 356. We would add that this approach makes 
his work not only "more difficult to analyze" but also more difficult to perform 
because it requires greater effort. 
